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Post-Cold War Trajectories of Memory and 
Oblivion in Bulgaria and Kosovo1
ELENA GKARTZONIKA
A fertile ground of research on social relations is offered upon examining the 
conditions under which, groups of power engaged in a dispute for political/economic 
control choose to impose social oppression, thus disorienting people in misleading 
ventures for democratic consolidation. Our comparative analysis, as a method of 
research, perceives the past in two dimensions: as a cluster of older realities and as 
the content of the current collective memory – a political issue at stake. As for the past 
realities, we attempt a critical content analysis of the available evidence. Concerning 
their present representation, our analysis investigates the mechanism of selecting and 
reconstructing the past or how social (ab)uses of the past are formulated as collective 
memory, in a process closely correlated with present socio-economic transformations2. 
Thus, collective memory is not an eventual issue of remembrances, but rather the result 
of prevailing forces’ image and their interrelations within a social formation. Besides 
tracing elements of ”cultural hegemony”3, the analysis will also look at the effects of 
the ”ideological state apparatus on the reproduction of the production conditions”4, 
1 For images and documents of the two case-studies, please consult the online appendix: 
http://l1-balkandecks.blogspot.com/2011/10/oblivious-memories.html. Another version of 
this paper, focusing on (neo)populist aspects of both cases, was presented at the 7th Conference 
in Social Sciences – ”What Follows after the Crisis? Approaches to Global Transformations” 
(CEU Budapest, May 27th -29th, 2011).
2 See: Maurice HALBWACHS, On Collective Memory, Chicago University Press, 1992; 
Matthias FRITSCH, The Promise of Memory: History and Politics in Marx, Benjamin and Derrida, 
New York Univ., New York, 2006; Jeffrey OLICK, The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory 
and Historical Responsibility, Routledge, New York, London, 2007; Ernst H. GOMBRICH, The 
Uses of Images: Studies in the Social Function of Art and Visual Communication, Phaidon, London, 
1999; Andreas HUYSSEN, Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory, Stanford 
University Press, California, 2003; Paul CONNERTON, How Societies Remember, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1989; Tzvetan TODOROV, Les Abus de la mémoire, Arlea, Paris, 
1995; John GILLIS, Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, Princeton University, 
Princeton, 1994; Frances PINE et al.(eds.), Memory, Politics and Religion: the Past Meets the Present 
in Europe, Lit, Munster, 2004; Katharine HODGKIN, Susannah RADSTONE, Contested Pasts: 
The Politics of Memory, Routledge, New York-London, 2003; Matt MATSUDA, The Memory of the 
Modern, Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1996; David SUMMERS, Real Spaces: World Art History 
and the Rise of Western Modernism, Phaidon, London, 2003; Jan W. MULLER, Memory and Power 
in Postwar Europe – Studies in the Presence of the Past, Cambridge University, Cambridge, 2002; 
Christian COQ, Jean-Pierre BACOT, Travail de mémoire, 1914-1998: une necessité dans un siècle 
de violence, Éd. Autrement, Paris, 1999; Conny MITHANDER et al. (eds), Collective Traumas: 
Memories of War and Conflict in 20th century Europe, P.I.E.P. Lang, Bruxelles, 2007.
3 As defined by Antonio GRAMSCI, Prison Notebooks, 3 vols, Columbia University, New 
York, 1992, 1996, 2010.
4 Louis ALTHUSSER, ”Idéologie et appareils idéologiques d’État (Notes pour une recherche)”, 
La Pensée, no. 151, 1970, pp. 3-38.
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and ”the temporal matrix within which, national territorial identity and socio-cultural 
tradition are crystallized”1, while analyzing the cases of Buzludža and Gazimestan. 
As lieux de mémoire2 they both lay ”concrete” foundations for a time-spatial approach 
towards the state’s practices3 and their realization, turning our paradigms into a safe 
indicator for the above-mentioned ”cadres”4.
Such a manifold approach to memory materialization5 could not find a more 
efficient application than in post-Cold War Balkans. Bulgaria and Ex-Yugoslavia are 
similar cases in the sense that both versions of collective memory were originally 
constructed in the Warsaw-Pact frame, but different in the sense that Buzludža was 
constructed in a socialist country, a former national state, while Gazimestan Tower was 
erected within a socialist federation transformed, after the dissolution of the bipolar 
world, into a country. The political and ideological (dis)similarities also suggest the 
need to take into account a socialist and post-socialist periodization.
TWO PARADIGMS OF A CRITICAL CONJECTURE
Ten years after the last wars in South-Eastern Europe, a collection of transitional 
or hybrid regimes are still oscillating in a grey zone between the democratic and 
authoritarian poles, halting or delaying their transformation. Corruption is rising, 
division lines between East and West are perpetuated, and solidarity is in decline. 
The post-1989 European democracy could have had the crucial effect it had promised 
for the region. However, rather than stopping it, the pace of separatist processes 
accelerated with a series of declarations, setting overwhelming majorities as a criterion 
for legalizing political entities. Illusions reproduced old forms of domination6 in 
times of unrest and international restructure of the haut-finance7. Accordingly, Balkan 
socio-ideological life failed to abolish the impact of penetration that distorted the 
political and economic contradictions8. People of the region seem ready to endure 
dysfunctional states and badly-governed democracies, defusing their ire or need for 
change by claiming ”brave” ancestors. ”Victories”, at least symbolic, seem total.
1 Nicos POULANTZAS, L’État, le Pouvoir, le Socialisme, Presses Universitaires de France, 
Paris, 1978.
2 Pierre NORA, Les Lieux de mémoire 2. La Nation, Gallimard, Paris, 1986.
3 Henri LEFEBVRE, Espace et politique (Le droit à la ville II), Anthropos, Paris, 1973; IDEM, 
La production de l’espace, Anthropos, Paris, 1974. 
4 Maurice HALBWACHS, Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire, Presses Universitaires de France, 
Paris, 1925.
5 Maynard SOLOMON, Marxism and Art: Essays Classic and Contemporary, Knopf, New 
York, 1973.
6 C. Wright MILLS, The Power Elite, Oxford University Press, New York, 1956.
7 Karl POLANYI, The Great Transformation, Rinehart, New York, 1944.
8 L.S. STAVRIANOS, ”The Influence of the West in the Balkans”, in Charles and Barbara 
JELAVICH (eds), Balkans in Transition, California University Press, Berkeley, 1963, pp. 184-226.
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”Forget Your Past”: 
Buzludža, Ownerless Communist National Memories
 
Buzludža is one of the historical peaks in Bulgaria’s Central Stara Planina. As part 
of today’s ”Šipka-Buzludža” national park museum, it is reached by a 12 kilometers 
side-road from Šipka Pass. Near this passage point, on Stoletov peak, stands Šipka 
Memorial, designed by the architect A. Donkov and the sculptor Al. Andreev and 
inaugurated in 1934, to commemorate those dead for the liberation of Bulgaria during 
the Russian-Turkish War (1877-1878). It is a monument of great importance for the 
national appeal, enhancing Bulgaria’s bonds with Tsarist Russia/Soviet Union.
On the opposite peak, Buzludža, another monument was inaugurated on August 
28, 1981 by the leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), T. Živkov. It was 
erected to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the Buzludža Congress of 1891. On that 
year, social-democrats led by D. Blagoev (1856-1924) assembled secretly and founded 
the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Workers Party1. Thus, the Buzludža monument was 
erected by the ruling BCP in remembrance of that meeting, institutionalizing its socio-
political struggle and transforming the place into a reminder of its own prehistory. 
The monument also symbolized Bulgaria’s ”rebellious” past, being built where the 
final battle between the Ottomans and the Bulgarian band led by Hadži Dimitâr took 
place and where he fell (1868) becoming an inspiring national martyr and symbol2.
The very date of the inauguration generously provided the Bulgarian socialist 
present with a third moment of the national history. In 1981, the 1300th anniversary 
of the foundation of the Bulgarian State in 681 by Asparuh was also celebrated. A 
grandiose plan enhancing both a remembrance of the medieval state and a laudation 
of the present socialist one was accompanied by a plethora of activities ranging from 
history to politics or military institutions (coinage, medals), the publication of collective 
volumes or proceedings of congresses etc. Architectural projects were also carried out 
massively: restoration of monuments (such as the finishing up of the fortress of Veliko 
Târnovo, Tsarevets, founded in 1930), the foundation of commemorating multi-leveled 
buildings, the erection of huge monuments in the capital as well as in the provinces 
(such as the ”1300-years monument: Past, Present and Future”, the most controversial 
monument in Sofia3 and ”Bulgaria 1300 years: Founders of Bulgarian State” Monument 
in Šumen). Economic events were likewise linked with similar past ones. The 100 
years history of the national coin, the lev (lion, the traditional Bulgarian symbol), was 
1 Blagoev linked the struggle for the Bulgarian working-class interests and the love for 
homeland with proletarian internationalism. In his work What Is Socialism and Can It Take Root 
Here? (Sofia, 1891), he expounded scientific socialism’s basic propositions. His book From 
the History of Socialism in Bulgaria (1906), initiating Bulgarian Marxist historiography, was 
highly regarded for Working-class Party’s ideological fortification and its struggle, against 
opportunism, theoretical substantiation.
2 Hristo Botev (1848-1876), Bulgaria’s ”revered” national poet and revolutionary, titled 
after him his most famous and still influential poem on the uprising, first published in the 
illegal newspaper Nezavisimost (Independence) in 1873.
3 It was completed in 8 months with low quality controls, resulting in collapse after 4 
years. During the 1990’s it was completely abandoned by the state. In 2002, due to a visit by 
Pope John Paul II in Sofia, it was enclosed by a fence, a fact that made known the debate that 
concerned its future. 
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recalled1 along with its value – equal to that of the French franc – and the inscription 
on it, ”Bulgarians’ Union Creates Power” in Bulgarian, conveying nationalist civic/
ethno-populist aspirations for homogenization2. In 1981 the Bulgarian lev, pegged 
to the US dollar since 1962, was represented as going through its second decade of 
stability (albeit its convertibility to Western funds was not free, since black market 
rates were five to ten times higher than the official ones).
All the celebrations were carried out under the auspices of the ”1300 Years of 
Bulgaria Foundation” committee. This was a quasi-independent entity to support 
the Arts established by Živkov’s daughter, Ljudmila Živkova (1942-1981), Politburo 
member of the BCP Central Committee and Chairwoman of the Committee for 
Culture3. As a powerful intellectual leader of the Bulgarian Arts, she laid great 
emphasis on the indigenous Bulgarian culture. It was an idea formulated during the 
1970s and it marked the 1300th anniversary of the foundation of the Bulgarian state 
in the Balkan Peninsula, celebrated in the year of her much-discussed death. Her 
preference for ”moulded personalities” and the idea of ”beauty in public life”4 were 
not to be fully developed, nor were they applied for long. Soon after her death, her 
father removed her idealistic book on ”beauty’s laws” from circulation, along with 
most of her protégés from their influential state-posts. Actually, some of them were 
accused of misappropriating public funds intended for the Arts, with their Foundation 
– literal and metaphoric – involved in serious corruption.
The prevailing patrimonial dimension already described, relevant to the financial 
as well as the aesthetic aspect, finds its ultimate expression in the Buzludža monument. 
16 000 000 leva were collected as both voluntary and obligatory donations for the 
construction of the House of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the largest monument 
in Bulgaria. Eventually, 14 186 000 leva were used, while the rest were spent for the 
construction of three kindergartens. It took military construction units almost seven 
years to complete it, together with more than 6.000 workers and experts. Under the 
guidance of the Bulgarian honorary member of World Architecture Community, 
G. Stoilov, more than twenty leading Bulgarian artists worked on the interior decoration 
for eighteen months. Verses from ”The International” and ”The Worker’s March” were 
inscribed on its façade. The interior used to be partly covered in marble, while the 
staircases were decorated with red stained glass. The foyer was fringed with blown 
out windows, providing unobstructed views of the surrounding countryside. In the 
fifteen meters high main hall of the memorial, a 500 square meters marquetry-fresco 
portrayed Marx, Engels, Lenin, and, on the opposite wall Živkov, next to D. Blagoev 
1 According to the Bulgarian National Bank the commemorative coinage reached the total 
of 5 492 000 coins of copper/nickel (1, 2 and 5 leva) and silver (25, 50 and 1000 leva).
2 See Hans KOHN, The Idea of Nationalism, Macmillan, New York, 1967 [1944].
3 She created Sofia’s National Gallery of World Art, with a large collection of foreign 
paintings and statues acquired on world markets while ensuring the rapid construction 
of National Palace of Culture, the largest multifunctional centre in South-Eastern Europe 
(construction’s steel surpassed Eiffel Tower in 3000 tons) and ”2005 world’s best”, according 
to the International Organization of Congress Centers. She also produced the Banner of Peace-
International Children’s Assembly in Sofia under the auspices of Unesco. On her life see: 
Богомил РАЙНОВ, ”Людмила: мечти и дела” (”Ljudmila: Dreams and Deeds”), Продуцентска 
къща (Producentska kašta), vol. 2, no. 1/2, 2003.
4 L. ZHIVKOVA, According to the Laws of Beauty, Gruner, Amsterdam, 1981 [1979].
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and G. Dimitrov (1882-1949, Bulgaria’s first communist leader)1, between depictions 
of women, men and children in a variety of communist themes. The dome was layered 
with thirty tons of copper. Two stars of ”ruby” glass (rubino oro), twelve meters high, 
were built-in on top of a seventy meters high pylon, symbolizing a waving communist 
flag. These Buzludža stars – three times bigger than the Kremlin stars and the biggest 
in the world – were manufactured in the Soviet Union, an emblematic symbol 
of Bulgaria’s bonds with it. Upon inauguration, Živkov embedded a bottle inside 
the walls holding a message for future generations on the historical significance of 
Buzludža. In his opening speech he emphatically noted: ”Let us never desert the trails 
that lead here, of this legendary mountain, Buzludža”2.
For a more thorough understanding of the ideological construction of the 
Buzludža-memorial, the only available information is offered by an interview given 
by its ”national” architect, published in the year of celebration3. According to his 
idealistic description –reminding Živkova’s discourse – the monument was perceived 
as a place for education in the spirit of socialist ideals. It was intended to reflect the 
deep roots of the people’s culture and the peak of their present achievements, revealing 
their beauty and the bright future that is reserved through them. Simultaneously, it 
expressed great emotions associated with Buzludža peak. Apart from echoing the 
heroic battles of Hadzi Dimitâr, it was associated with more important political and 
military events of Bulgaria’s recent past, namely its union (”sâjedinenieto”) with Eastern 
Rumelia (1885) and the early-1940s heroic partisan battles against the monarch-fascist 
forces. Buzludža, forged by Stoilov with such symbolic messages, acquired a ”poetic” 
image sculpted out to become a sacred place, reminding a variety of national events. 
For Stoilov, an important element in determining its volume and final form was 
the proximity of previously constructed sanctuaries, with Šipka-peak’s monument 
of liberation crowning the area. He also achieved a more favorable perception of 
its silhouette from other distant places in sight, such as the field of Kazanlâk or the 
highway Sofia-Burgas etc. The Buzludža monument, built so as to offer an impressive 
volume from a distance, was expected to enrich the approaching visitor’s experience, 
not only in a three-dimensional perspective but also in its fourth dimension: time. 
Stoilov’s solution resided in the idea of unity in both concept and function. Its main 
functional portion was transformed into ”plastic volume, with a dynamic composition 
of a vertical and a spherical body being introduced in the environment of the park’s 
territory”. Moreover, the ”purity of materials”, of durable nature (concrete on the 
outside and marble in the interior), was represented as completing the architectural 
unity in composition and style, together with other elements of the synthesis (f.i. the 
enamel marquetry in natural stone colors). The dome going far beyond the round 
wall, closes the amphitheater without touching it. In Stoilov’s own words, his 
intention was to create ”an architectural metaphor”, a new dome under which a sense 
1 He negotiated with Josip Broz Tito the creation of a Balkan Federative Republic, separated 
from the rest of the Slavic world, an obstacle to Stalin’s aspirations for total control over the 
Eastern Bloc. The idea resulted in the 1947 Bled accord. Its policies were reversed after the Tito-
Stalin split in June 1948, when Bulgaria, subordinated to the interests of the Soviet Union, 
turned against Yugoslavia. 
2 Georgi STOILOV, ”Dom-pametnik Buzludža. Intervju s narodnija arhitekt Georgi Stoilov” 
(”House-monument Buzludža, Interview with the national architect Georgi Stoilov”), Muzei i 
Pametnici na Kulturata, vol. 21, no. 6, Komitet za kultura, Sofia, 1981, p. 8. 
3 Ibidem, pp. 5-8. 
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of infinity is achieved through a series of concentric circles ”expanding from a single 
center to infinity”. Light, a strong factor for emotional impact, played an important 
role in creating the atmosphere and it was used carefully ”from the outside with 
plenty of light entering the facilities in a damping range and, afterwards, reaching 
the solemn hall to complete an emotional load”. The same approach was perceived 
on the inauguration night of the monument, ”with careful modeling of forms, using 
white and golden light”, while the bright light of the “ruby” star complemented the 
whole setting.
From the aforementioned artistic hyper-maximalism one has to reach the absolute 
minimalism, both equally charged with political symbolism, at the moment of the 
populist shift in the post-Cold War trajectories of the communist legacy. On November 
10, 1989 Živkov stepped down, after thirty five years in power. Immediately, the 
Politburo ordered the removal of his portrait from the Buzludža memorial. The latter, 
being property of the ex-Communist Party, was ceded to the state in 1991, only to 
be abandoned and, consequently, open to looting. Today, it is mostly known as ”the 
UFO”, a surrealistic, derogatory term used even by Bulgarian tourist-guides. Besides 
the damage caused by weather conditions and the state’s inertia for its protection, 
acts of destruction are visible on its façade. The red graffiti above its entrance, ”Forget 
Your Past”, written in English and with a certain attention for the lettering, conveys 
more than the monument’s lamentable fate: once a symbol of national pride, today 
it is neglected and ransacked. Unlike the Thracian tombs representing a ”golden” 
past, either the opposite Šipka-Pass that commemorate glorious wars for the national 
independence or the Rose Valley, an example of Bulgaria’s ”blossoming” economy, it 
is sinking in disdain along with the Cold war socialist regime. Its case is not unique. 
Not surprisingly more than one hundred monuments constructed between 1945 and 
1989 were equally condemned to oblivion, either by abandonment, destruction (like 
G. Dimitrov’s mausoleum in Sofia), transformation, or sale1.
The House of the Bulgarian Communist Party in Buzludža, as a memory/oblivion 
paradigm in times of political upheavals, illustrates the social impact of the incessantly 
selective usage of the past by the political powers. A piece of art allegedly presented as 
a socialist avant-garde monument, carried rather the dominant totalitarian aesthetic, 
seeking to create an image of a classless society, not a vanguard against it. Moreover, it 
imposed for political reasons a historical abuse which after the state-capitalist shift of the 
1990s was to be proven totally useless. Purposefully standing neglected and ravaged as 
a socialist wreck, it is not heralding optimistic social messages. As Bl. Vâlkov, professor 
of the Faculty of Architecture at the University of Sofia has aptly stated:
”In defining the fate of monuments, their significance for shaping the public 
environment is also of particular importance. The landscape is complex and rich 
in terms of memories and forms, as well as with relation to power. Pulling down 
monuments creates fragmentation and indifference, as well as insecurity”2.
1 See http://www.buzludja.com, http://nikolamihov.com/forget_your_past.html and 
http://dprbcn.wordpress.com/2010/03/22/communist-political-monuments-in-bulgaria/ 
(accessed 30.10.2010).
2 Blagovest VÂLKOV, ”The Stones of Memory”, a statement to ”The communist monu-
ments”, ABITARE, vol. 492, no. 3, 2009 (Source: web-project DPR-BARCELONA).
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Gazimestan:
Ex-Communist Medieval Memory under Surveillance
 
In Serbia the official national holiday on June 28th celebrating the day of St Vitus is 
a date of high significance since the ”notorious” Kosovo Battle is commemorated1. The 
Battle was fought in 1389 between the army led by Serbian Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović 
and the invading – for more than a decade – Ottoman army, under the leadership of 
Sultan Murad I. Both Lazar and Murad lost their lives during the battle, the bulk of 
both armies were wiped out, and those remaining withdrew from Kosovo. The battle 
ended in a draw.
Seventy years before the actual defeat of the medieval Serbian state by the Ottoman 
powers, it was a time when no nations, in modern terms, existed, only moderately 
Christian local lords linked to their land and the emperor, while land and power were 
fragmented. Yet, the earliest traces of a Kosovo legend appeared in late 14th century’s 
chronicles and correspondence with the West, in which a ”Christian triumph” was 
quite openly claimed. A myth was to be further enforced relying on speculations, 
propagandizing heroism and treachery – linked to hereditary claims, or acquiring local 
colors. Additionally, under the tutelage and close supervision of the Church – since it 
was the only institution that survived the Ottoman conquest – by the late 16th century, 
and early 17th century, it had already taken a specific Serbian shape, whilst gradually 
18th century’s texts and paintings managed to narrate it in a proto-nationalist form. 
Eventually, it was the 19th century’s writers, mainly Vuk Karadžić (1787-1864), 
who transformed the Kosovo myth into a gripping national ideology. Even though 
sources are indefinite2 and not even one speaks explicitly about a ”Turkish victory”, a 
defeat at the hands of the Turkish army was used to represent the subordinate Serbian 
nation as one of hero-martyrs rebelling against the Turkish oppressors, inspiring ideals 
of self-sacrifice – not even Montenegro failed to incorporate Kosovo in its national 
ideology3. Ever since, emerging Christian/national characteristics were defined in 
sharp contrast to the ones of the Ottoman Turks. Among them, the emphasis on Lazar’s 
canonization in 1390 and his cult were also used to secure the coherence of the Serb 
flock. Similar ventures created a deep belief in religious symbols and practices, which 
survived until the 19th century’s national states formation. However, the conditions 
under which nations sought to be created were not unrelated to the inherent need 
for geographical expansion, relying on the assistance of Western, fellow-Christian 
powers. Ergo, the Balkans, sarcastically called ”Balkanie” by the well-known French 
geographer Élisée Reclus (1830-1905), were described as an area in which a remarkable 
system of consecutive foreign sovereignties was exercised ”en cascades”4.
1 Milorad EKMEČIĆ, ”The Emergence of St Vitus Day as the Principal National Holiday of 
the Serbs”, in Wayne VUCINICH, Thomas EMMERT (eds.), Kosovo Legacy of a Medieval Battle, 
Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis, 1991, pp. 331-342.
2 On the 550th anniversary of the Battle: Mihailo DINIĆ, ”Istorija jos nije uspela da 
razluci istorisko Kosovo od legendarnog” (”History Still Can Not Distinguish Historical from 
Legendary Kosovo”), Politika, 28/06/1939, p. 3.
3 Petar II PETROVIĆ-NJEGOŠ (1813-1851), Горски вијенац (Mountain Wreath), Armenian 
Mechitarist monastery, Vienna, 1847. Njegoš transformed the legacy of Kosovo’s martyrdom 
into a compelling force, determined to eliminate foreign dominion from all South Slav lands.
4 Élisée RECLUS, Nouvelle Géographie Universelle, 2 vols, Hachette, Paris, 1876-1894; IDEM, 
L’Homme et la Terre, vol. 1, F. Maspero, Paris, 1982 [1905-1908], pp. 93, 161.
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It was in such processes that, during the 20th century, the myth of Kosovo 
was embedded in collective memory, remaining important in the Serbian-Albanian 
conflict over Kosovo and Metohija. To enhance its significance, the Serbian Patriar-
chate represented Kosovo as the cradle of the Serbian state, a ”sacred land”, and 
”Golgotha”1 – becoming the driving force of the secular outlook of religious identifi-
cation. Formulated to create a generative process, it led to the connection of all 
important events to the very date of the battle, cementing its memory with a timeless, 
emblematic significance. Not accidentally, on the same day in 1914, the Serb student 
Gavrilo Princip assassinated the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand on a bridge in 
Sarajevo, an event that dragged the region into the Great War. Seven years later, in 
1921, Yugoslavia got its first modern constitution ratified by establishing the Kingdom 
of Serbs, Croatians and Slovenians. Even the exclusion of the Yugoslav Party from 
Cominform – the final split between Yugoslavia and Soviet Union –, was publicly 
announced on the same date in 1948, obviously marking the independence of the 
Federation2, remarkably embedded in the aforementioned context.
This myth-formatting process is mostly known in its Serbian/Christian variant, 
but the area of Gazimestan proves that similar processes also occurred in the Muslim 
side. Etymologically, Gazimestan derives from gazi, meaning ”hero” in Turkish, and, 
in Arabic ”warrior”, and mesto, meaning ”place” in Serbian. Thus, this place-name, 
not an unusual mixture for the Balkan demographic and linguistic realities, also 
conveys in Turkish/Arabic the local sealing of the second protagonist of the fight in a 
”land of Hero-Warriors”. Two memorial loci are of high significance for the Muslims: 
The Bayraktar Türbe, a mausoleum built at the center of the field, in honor of Sultan 
Murad’s standard-bearer (bayraktar), killed during the 1389 battle. The tomb is an 
important sanctuary for the followers of the Sadiye Derviş Order, to which Murad’s 
standard-bearer is believed to have belonged3. The second is Meşhed-i Hüdâvendigâr, 
a mausoleum erected in honor of the martyr sultan Murad, where his intestines are 
buried4, on the spot where it is believed that his tent was located and he was allegedly 
killed during the Kosovo Battle. For generations the duty to guard it, passed from 
father to son within the Türbedari (guardians of the tomb) family, who resides right 
next to it. In the wider area, tombstones of former Muslim governors of Skopje are 
1 See Ivo BANAC, The National Question in Yugoslavia Origins, History, Politics, Cornell 
University, Ithaca London, 1984; Olga ZIROJEVIĆ, ”Kosovo in the Collective Memory”, in 
Nebojša POPOV (ed.), The Road to War in Serbia Trauma and Catharsis, CEU, Budapest, New York, 
2000 [1996], pp. 189-211; Radmila RADIĆ, ”L’Église serbe et la «question serbe»” in N. POPOV 
(dir.), Radiographie d’un nationalisme. Les racines serbes du conflit yougoslave, Editions de l’Atelier, 
Paris, 1998 [1996]; Ivan DJURIC, Glossaire de l’espace yougoslave, Esprit des Péninsules, Paris, 
1999, pp. 85-92; Ivan ČOLOVIĆ, The Politics of Symbols in Serbia: Essays in Political Anthropology, 
Hurst & Co., London, 2002 [2000]. On the Serbian Church’s discourse, see: Archimandrite 
Athanase JEVTIĆ, Dossier Kosovo, L’Âge d’Homme, Paris, 1991; A. JEVTIĆ, Stradanja Srba na 
Kosovu i Metohiji od 1941 do 1990 (”The Suffering of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija from 1941 to 
1990”), Jesinstvoto, Priština, 1990. An exhibition was also organised jointly by the Serbian and 
the Church of Greece titled Κόσοβο Ιερά γη, in Athens (2006).
2 A decision contrasting Bulgaria’s denouncement of the Bled accord in the same year. 
3 A white round-shaped building with turquoise cupola, which is being looked after by a 
small group of Sadiye Derviş followers in Priština, after being heavily damaged during the late 
1990’s conflicts.
4 Murad’s actual remains were sent to his imperial mausoleum in Bursa, the first capital 
of the Ottoman Empire. 
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also visible (Rifat Paşa, Hafiz Paşa). The mausoleum is said to have been reconstructed 
by Hurşid Paşa, the famous repressor of Karađorđe Petrović’s revolt, associated with 
one of the most dramatic moments of the Serbian uprisings, the elevation of the Skull 
Tower in Niš, Serbia1.
Thus, Gazimestan is the meeting place of two religious powers, officially in 
conflict for centuries. In Tito’s Yugoslavia (1953) the rivalry was reinstated in a modern, 
patriotic context, when a Memorial Tower of equally enormous dimensions like the 
one at Buzludža was erected, paying tribute to Lazar and his army. The Memorial 
Tower of the Kosovo Battle designed by the Serbian architect – professor at the 
University of Belgrade, member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts –, Al. 
Deroko (1894-1988) represents a medieval tower in a shape simulating the Crusaders’ 
towers in Mistra2, Greece. The tower is about twenty five meters high, and stands on 
an elevated platform, surrounded by four concrete chimneys and benches, together 
with about twenty five acres of the surrounding land. More than 100 steps lead up to 
the viewing platform on Tower’s top, from where Kosovo Plain is visible.
Near the Tower, a marble column bears chiseled a 15th century lyrical epitaph 
chant to Lazar written by his son, Despot Stefan Lazarević. Despite its Christian 
verbalism, the text reminds of the epitaph of Simonides of Ceos for the dead Spartans 
in the Battle of Thermopylae, in a synthesis that reveals an attempt to highlight the 
significance of the battle of Kosovo: the glory of unity of small powers. In its sixty 
seven lines, the column explains to visitors that ”in stone nature, I am placed among 
the bones of the dead, upright in the middle of the field, representing the cross and 
the flag” to remind to every ”stranger or hailing from this soil”, upon ”entering the 
Serbian land of Kosovo” of Lazar, a ”Serbian ruler, an unwavering pillar of piety”, 
who ”loved everything that Christ wanted” and ”accepted the sacrificial wreath 
of struggle and heavenly glory”. He ”was saved by God, after bravely suffering in 
Hagarene hands, becoming a martyr of Christ”3.
On the Tower’s façade visitors also read ”Косовска/Кнежева клетва” (”Kosovo’s/
Prince’s Curse”) with which, according to the legend, Lazar cursed before the Battle 
those Serbs ”of birth, blood and heritage”, who ignored his call for a united, defensive 
war against the Ottomans. Noteworthy is that its motives are only updating the 
medieval Christian worldview in a socialist environment, highlighting the impact of 
the religious poetry that first appeared in the 1845 edition of V. Karadžić’s collection 
of Serbian folk songs; the notable lack of reference to the Serb blood and heritage in 
the 1813 edition indicates a posterior rise of Serbian nationalism. In that context, the 
curse reminds and/or is reminded by the Serbian ocila (firesteels), a term associated 
with Serbian coat of arms, where four firesteels are displayed around a central cross. 
Deliberately simulating Byzantine firesteel acronym from Palaeologan era (last 
Byzantine dynasty before Ottoman conquest)4, it refers to a popular slogan among 
1 A tower created by Ottomans after the Čegar hill Battle, in 1809. Built on the sides of a 
cubical structure, the mounted skulls of the dead rebels (including Karađorđe’s) served as a 
warning against rebellions.
2 A strategically important location, six kilometers northwest of Sparta in Peloponnesos. 
After the middle of the 13th century it gradually became the political and spiritual center of the 
(semi)autonomous Despotate of Morea.
3 Quotations are parts of the inscription, translated from Serbian by the author. The only 
copy of the initial text from the column that Stefan is said to have placed in the same spot is 
preserved in the Serbian Patriarchal Library (no. 167).
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Serbs, which is frequently used in times of national crisis. The phrase ”Only Unity 
Saves Serbs” in Serbian, is displayed on a cross, forming an acronym of four C-shaped 
firesteels. Its message can be connected to the similar, afore-commented Bulgarian 
one. Sometimes it also reads ”Saint Sava Serbian Patron” in Serbian, referring to the 
founder of the Serbian Church (1217), son of Stefan Nemanja, who laid the basis of a 
unified medieval state. Using ocila as symbol, the contemporary Serbian nationalist 
movement, named ”1389”, perpetuates the political nuances of the overloaded 
historical date.
These symbolic memories and emotional overloads were re-activated on the 
occasion of the 600th anniversary of the battle, in 1989, when Slobodan Milošević chose 
Gazimestan Tower to deliver a fiery speech to the masses. Then, instead of the ocila, 
the years 1389 and 1989 were inscribed within the cross. In some cases the message 
was better illustrated. In between the years 1389 and 1989, a picture of the Tower, 
and the phrase ”six centuries from the Kosovo Battle” in Serbian, were added. Both 
representations connected the memory of the Battle of Kosovo with Milošević’s own 
policy, namely the reduction of the autonomy-status of the Kosovo province and the 
rights of the mostly Muslim Albanian population, established by the 1974 Yugoslavian 
Constitution. In his speech, among others, Milošević pointed out:
”What has been certain throughout all centuries until our time is that 
disharmony struck Kosovo 600 years ago. If we lost the battle, then this was not 
only the result of social superiority and the armed advantage of the Ottoman 
Empire, but also of the tragic disunity in the leadership of the Serbian state at 
that time [...] six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles [...] 
They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet […] 
Our chief-battle now concerns implementing the economic, political, cultural, 
and general social prosperity, finding a quicker and more successful approach 
to a civilization in which people will live in the 21st century. For this battle, we 
certainly need heroism, of course of a somewhat different kind, but that courage, 
without which nothing serious and great can be achieved, remains unchanged 
and urgently necessary”1.
As a response, Albanian nationalism led to tensions with Serbs, enhancing 
separatist tendencies in the region that led to the Wars of the late-1990’s, causing NATO 
to intervene in order to stop what was identified by the Alliance, the EU and Western 
media2 as an on-going campaign of ethnic cleansing. The idea of a lost ancestral, 
Greater land and the consequent practices to claim it challenged the Socialist Federal 
Republic model of governance and succeeded3 – mainly due to the fear and skepticism 
about a domino development that could have destabilized Europe, especially after the 
demise of Eastern Germany. Actually, it was the uncertainty of global imbalances and 
”containment” strategies that resulted in fragmentation and consequent formation 
of disputed areas needing guidance. Hence, since 2007 it offers the excuse for the 
1 Four Stylized Greek Β’s for the imperial motto King of Kings Ruling over Kings, in Greek.
2 See the relative analysis on the aforementioned Bulgarian lev inscription.
3 Nebojša POPOV, ”Srpski populizam; Od marginalne do dominantne pojave” (”Serbian 
Populism; from Marginal to Dominant Phenomenon”), Vreme, 24/05/1993. Milošević’s speech 
can be consulted online at: http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/spch-kosovo1989.htm 
(accessed 30.10.2011).
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Tower’s guardianship by KFOR troops alongside Kosovo Protection Corps (former 
UÇK, Kosovo Liberation Army)1 granting to it political legitimacy. Visitors, mostly 
Serbians, need to show to the guards their ID cards upon entering. The oppressive 
ambience around the monument, disregarding notions of cultural protection2, was 
completed with a surrounding fence accompanied by tanks. In 2010 a North Atlantic 
Council’s decision replaced the military necessity of KFOR with that of Kosovo Police 
Service. In Kosovo’s supervised independent area, the Tower is still monitored as 
a place of potential conflicts, exposed to endless political usages: later in 2010, the 
newly restored Murad’s mausoleum was inaugurated by the Turkish prime-minister 
R. T. Erdoğan, obviously in the frames of the neo-Ottoman political doctrine. After 
highlighting it as the first symbol of Islam, ”a seed of peace, brotherhood and unity 
that took root in Gazimestan’s soil 711 years ago, later reaching Vienna”, he didn’t fail 
to promise diplomatic and economic assistance3.
CONCLUSION
The aforementioned aesthetic dimensions4 of the Buzludža and Gazimestan monu-
ments clarify the symbolisms of the prevailing discourses, as instruments used to 
satisfy current and past aspirations of supremacy. After World War II they were 
identified as a nationalist verbosity covering the socialist vacuum. In the Bulgarian 
case, they resulted in a disdain for any positive aspects of socialism and, consequently 
the memory of everything this regime constructed. Reversion rather than disdain is 
visible in Kosovo. Here, Western paternalism, in a neo-colonial model of governance, 
legalized through ”international community’s” military guard the transformation of 
the Serbian/Yugoslav collective memory into a Kosovar one and protected it from 
ethnically determined enemies. 
In the post-Cold War era, democratization was introduced with domestic 
costs of rule adoption5. In Bulgaria it resulted in the permanence of influential and 
opportunistic political groups, remnants of the former system, which preyed on the 
actual institution of the state, perpetuating socio-economic disparities6. Similarly, 
in ex-Yugoslav countries, following the failure of the post-1989 political project to 
solve economic problems and to call for homogeneous nation-building, the people 
1 Noam CHOMSKY, Edward HERMAN, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of 
the Mass Media, Pantheon, New York, 1988. 
2 Julie MERTUS, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths started a War, California University Press, 
California, 1999; Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Albania (ed.), The Truth on Kosova, 
Encyclopedia Publishing House, Tirana, 1993; Paulin KOLA, In Search of Greater Albania, Hurst 
& Co, London, 2003, pp. 181-182.
3 In 1999 KLA had set explosive charges and badly damaged the Tower.
4 Gretel ADORNO, R. TIEDEMANN (eds), Adorno Aesthetic Theory, Routledge, London, 
1984 [1966]; Herbert MARCUSE, The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward A Critique of Marxist Aesthetics, 
Beacon, Boston, 1979.
5 Frank SCHIMMELFENNIG, Ulrich SEDELMEIER, ”Governance by Conditionality: EU 
Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, vol. 11, no. 4, August 2004, pp. 669-687.
6 Veselin GANEV, Preying on the State: The transformation of Bulgaria after 1989, Cornell 
University Press, New York, 2007.
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of the Federation began confronting each other in relation to their respective ethnic/
religious prerogatives.
To sum up, the current state of the two monuments provides an insight into a 
new demagogy. Imposing close spatial and temporal control on places pre-selected 
to be ”re-constructed” into bearers of collective will, it negotiates nowadays a socio-
ideological consensus, along with the political one. The means used to this direction is 
the ideation of a false collective being, which finds its locus in an equally ”re-constructed” 
memory.  Since the only messages mediated are those by groups in power, social 
processes are related to specific distributions of power and influence. Thus the 
complex historical realities become oblivious, while the new memory oversimplifies 
and disorientates from the former social cadres. Lately, these processes are described 
as modern progressive tendencies regarding the past, influenced by similar European 
ones. Taking into consideration our paradigms, they seem more as politically correct 
attitudes regarding collective memory, socio-ideological modernities that only orbit 
around the core of European socio-political transformations1.
1 See f.i. Marshall BERMAN, All that is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity, Simon 
and Schuster, New York, 1982, pp 13-36, 87-130, 142-147, passim; John HARRISS, ”The Second 
’Great Transformation’? Capitalism at the end of the Twentieth Century”, in Tim ALLEN, Allan 
THOMAS (eds), Poverty and Development into the 21st Century, Open University and Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, New York, 2000, pp. 325-342; Raffaele SIMONE, Le monstre doux: 
L’occident vire-t-il à droite?, Gallimard, Paris, 2010.
